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A FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION
HENRY

I.

A. BEYER·

INTRODUCTION

For as much as the good education of children is of singular
behoof to any Common-wealth. . . . It is therefore ordered that
the Select men of everie town ... shall have a vigilant eye over
their brethren & and neighbours, to see, first that none of them
shall suffer so much barbarism in any of their families as not to
indeavour to teach by themselves or others, their children & ap
prentices so much learning as may inable them perfectly to read
the englishtongue, & knowledge of the Capital lawes: upo[n]
penaltie qf twentieshillings for each neglect therin.1

Thus did the early settlers of the Massachusetts Bay Colony ex
press their concern with establishing a uniform code of education.
Such stress on the importance of education has been a continuing
hallmark of American society. Thomas Jefferson was a strong advo
cate of government's responsibility to foster education as the basis of
an informed citizenry, an essential of democratic government:
Every government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the
people alone. The people themselves therefore are its only safe
depositories. And to render even them safe, their minds must be
improved to a certain degree. . . . An amendment of our [Vir
ginia] constitution must here come in aid of the public education. 2

Noah Webster observed that
[t]he general education of youth is an article in which the Ameri
can states are superior to all nations. . .. The institution of
schools, particularly in the New-England states, where the poorest
children are instructed in reading, writing, and arithmetic at the
• Interim Director, Center for Law and Health Sciences, Boston University
School of Law. B.S., Duquesne University, 1954; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1973. The
author wishes to express his appreciation for the research assistance of Leslie R. Miller,
Jackson College, Tufts University and Deborah M. Friedman, Boston University School
of Law.
I. Massachusetts Bay School Law (1642), reprinted in THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES
OF MASSACHUSETTS II (reprint ed. 1929) (emphasis deleted).
2. T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 148 (W. Peden ed. 1954).
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public expen[s]e, is a noble regulation, calculated to dignify the
human species. 3

Despite such early and continuing pronouncements, many
American citizens have historically been omitted from the main
stream of the educational movement. The Supreme Court's 1954 de
cision in Brown v. Board of Education 4 constituted a major legal
initiative to right one aspect of this wrong. There, the Court recog
nized that "[i]n these days, it is doubtful that any child may reason
ably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
an education."5 The Court went on to hold that "[s]uch an opportu
nity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms."6
Although, in Brown, the Court was addressing specifically the
right of black children not to be segregated from white children in
the educational process, the Court's words could have been applied
without difficulty to millions of children with mental or physical
handicaps. The great majority of public school districts were segre
gating such children from their nonhandicapped peers, were provid
ing them with grossly inappropriate educations from which they
could draw little if any benefit, or were excluding them entirely from
public educational systems. 7 These practices continued for decades
after the Brown decision. In 1972, for example, there were approxi
mately "22,000 retarded, emotionally disturbed, blind, deaf, and
speech or learning disabled children" in Washington, D.C., and
"perhaps as many as 18,000 of these children [were] not being fur
nished with programs of specialized education."8 The D.C. Board of
Education conceded that an estimated "12,340 handicapped children
were not to be served in the 1971-72 school year."9 The situation in
most states was not unlike that in the District of Columbia. 10 Penn
sylvania's 1965 "Mental Retardation Plan," for instance, estimated
3. N. Webster, SKETCHES OF AMERICAN POLICY 28 (H. Warfel ed. 1937).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. Id. at 493.
6. Id.
7. Burgdorf & Burgdorf. A Hislor), of Unequal Trealmenl: The Qualificalions of
Handicapped Persons as a "Suspeci Class" Under Ihe Equal Proleclion Clouse, 15 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 855, 869 (1975).
8. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.D.C. 1972).
9. Id. at 869.
10. In 1975. the United States Congress found that of the roughly eight million
children with handicaps in the United States, approximately one-million were excluded
entirely from the public school system and more than half were receiving an inappropri
ate education. 20 U.S.c. § 1400(b)(l), (3), (4) (Supp. V 1981).
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that 70,000 to .80,000 children with mental retardation between the
ages of five and twenty-one "were denied access to any public educa
tion services in schools, home or day care or other community facili
ties, or state residential institutions." II
Thus, as the 1970's commenced, the need and the moral right
were apparent. This article will discuss how that need has been ad.,
dressed and specific legal rights created through legislation and liti
gation, particularly in the federal Education for All Handicapped
Children Act (EAHCA).12 It will then examine the Supreme Court's
interpretation of that Act in Board ojEducation v. Rowley, 13 and will
finally consider the effect of the Rowley decision on the future educa
tional rights of children with handicaps.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

The PARC and Mills Decisions

In 1971 and 1972, two class actions based on equal protection
and due process grounds marked the beginning of change in this
area. These suitS-Pennsylvania Association jor Retarded Children
(PARe) v. Pennsylvania 14 and Mills v. Board of Education 15~stab
lished by consent agreement and court orders the following legal
principles and rights: (1) All children are capable of benefitting from
education and training;16 (2) all children are entitled to free public
education and training appropriate to their learning capacities; 17 and
(3) all children are entitled to as normal an educational placement as
possible. That is, placement in a regular public school class is pref
erable to placement in a special public school class; placement in a
special class in the public school is preferable to placement in a spe
cial school or program. IS
In Mills, a federal district court rejected the District of Colum
bia's argument that the District lacked the funding to educate all of
its children with handicaps.
If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services
11. Pennsylvania Ass'o for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279,
296 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (citing the Commonwealth's Mental Retardation Plan (C.M.R.P.) at
4,92,93, 142) (emphasis in original), mod!lYlirg, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
12. 20 U.S.c. §§ 1400-1420 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
13. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
14. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), mod(fied, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
15. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
16. fd. at 872; see 334 F. Supp. at 1259.
17. 348 F. Supp. at 871, 874; 334 F. Supp. at 1260.
18. 348 F. Supp. at 880; 334 F. Supp. at 1260.

366

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:363

and programs that are needed and desirable in the system then the
available funds must be expended equitably in such a manner that
no child is entirely excluded from a publicly supported education
consistent with his needs and ability to benefit therefrom. The in
adequacies of the District of Columbia Public School System
whether occasioned by insufficient funding or administrative inef
ficiency, certainly cannot be permitted to bear more heavily on the
'exceptional' or handicapped children than on the normal child. 19

B.

United States Supreme Court Decisions

In 1973, some advocates for citizens with handicaps expressed
concern that statements made by the Court in San Antonio Independ
ent School District v. Rodriguez ,20 to the effect that public education
is not a fundamental constitutional right,21 might seriously undercut
the principles established in PARC and Mills. Subsequent cases
have shown, however, that the holding ofRodriguez could be limited
to the issue of methods of public school financing and that it had
little effect on the educational rights of children with handicaps.22
Of greater relevance was the high Court's 1974 decision in Lau
v. Nichols .23 There, the Court considered the situation of 1800 pub
lic school children in San Francisco who were of Chinese ancestry.
The children did not understand English and were not provided with .
supplemental instruction or services to rectify this language defi
ciency. The Court recognized that the children were "certain to find
their classroom experiences wholly incomprehensible. . . ."24 The
Court acknowledged that the children were being "effectively fore
closed from any meaningful education"25 and ruled that the school
system's practices amounted to illegal discrimination. 26 The plight
of these children was remarkably similar to the situation of many
children with handicaps in schools devoid of special education or
related services.
19. 348 F. Supp. at 876.
20. 411 U:S. I (1973).
21. Id. at 35.
22. See, e.g., Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 835 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Fi
alkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 957-58 (E.D. Pa. 1975); In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d
441, 446 (N.D. 1974); see also Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. at 3043-44 (1982)
(citing PARe and Mills with apparent approval).
23. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
24. Id. at 566.
25. Id.
26. Id. The school system's practices were found to be in violation of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Id at 566-69.
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Slate Legislalion

In addition to court actions relevant to the educational rights of
children with handicaps, the early 1970's witnessed state legislative
action in this area. Prior to 1971, many state statutes contained pro
visions excluding from the educational system children with certain
physical or mental conditions. 27 In 1970, only fourteen states had
statutes mandating appropriate education to children with handi
caps.28 By 1974, however, this number had grown to forty-six. 29
Some of these state laws, such as Massachusetts' "Chapter 766"30
constituted sweeping revisions of previous special education legisla
tion and served as models 31 for the federal EAHCA.32
D. Federal Legislation and Lower Court Interpretations

Congress first demonstrated its concern with education of chil
dren with handicaps in 1966 when it amended the El"ementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965. 33 The amendment established a
grant program "for the purpose of assisting the States in the initia
tion, expansion, and improvement of programs and projects. . . for
the education of handicapped children . . . ."34 That program was
replaced in 1970 by the Education for the Handicapped Act.35 Both
the 1966 and 1970 acts were "aimed primarily at stimulating the
States to develop educational resources and to train persolliiel for
educating the handicapped."36 Neither contained specific guidelines
27. Comptroller General of the United States, Disparities Still Exist in Who Gets
SpeCial Education 3 (Sept. 30, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Disparities Still Exist].

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 1972 Mass. Acts 692 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71B
(West 1982). For a description of the goals and provisions of this act, see J.P. WILSON,
THE RIGHTS OF ADOLESCENTS IN THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 166·91 (1978). For a
description of the actual operation of chapter 766, and its provisions for a parent's appeal
of a school's special education decision, see generally M. BUDOFF, A. ORENSTEIN & c.
KERVICK, DUE PROCESS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION: ON GOING TO A HEARING (1982)
[hereinafter cited as M. BUDOFF].
31. See J.P. WILSON, supra note 30, at 166.
32. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400
1420 (1976 & Supp. V 1981»; see infra text accompanying notes 40-135.
33. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.c. §§ 236-244
(1976 & Supp. V 1981».
34. Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1966. Pub. L. No. 89
750, sec. 161, § 601(a), 80 Stat. 1191, 1204; see also Act of Nov. I, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89
313, sec. 6, § 5, 79 Stat. 1158, 1161-62 (amending title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965).
35. Pub. L. No. 91-230, §§ 601-662,84 Stat. 175-88 (1970).
36. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. at 3037 (1982) (citing S. REP. No. 168,
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for state use of the federal grants.
In 1974, spurred by the PARe and Mills decisions,37 Congress
greatly increased federal funding for the education of children with
handicaps and, for the first time, required states receiving these
funds to adopt "a goal of providing full educational opportunities to
all handicapped children. . .. "38 The 1974 statute was recognized
as an interim measure, adopted" 'in order to give the Congress an
additional year in which to study what, if any, additional Federal
assistance [was] required to enable the States to meet the needs of
handicapped children.' "39 In the following year, Congress enacted
and the President signed Public Law 94-142, the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act,40 a comprehensive statute that has revo
lutionized such education throughout the nation.
The EAHCA (the Act) requires that each state41 receiving fed
eral funds under the Act42 provide to each school-age child 43 a "free
appropriate public education."44 The Act adopted the major princi
ples laid down in PARe and Mills 45 as essential elements of such an
education. The Act mandates that an individual education program
(IEP) be developed to meet the unique educational needs of each
child with a handicap,46 that the child's parents or guardian be af~
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Congo & Ad. News 1425. 1429; H.R.
REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep. No. 332]).
See also Comptroller General of the United States, Unanswered Questions on Educating
Handicapped Children in Local Public Schools 1-3 (Feb. 5, 1981).
37. See supra text accompanying notes 14-19.
38. Education amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 615(c)( I). 88 Stat. 579.
583 (current version at 20 U.S.c. § 1414 (1976)).
39. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. at 3037 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 332.
supra note 36, at 4).
40. 20 U.S.c. §§ 1400-1420 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
41. The term "state" includes, in addition to the fifty states, the District of Colum
bia, the Commonwealth of Pueno Rico, Guam, American Samoa. the Virgin Islands.
and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. 20 U.S.c. § 140 I(6) (1976).
.
42. In 1982, all states except New Mexico were recipients of federal funds under
the EAHCA. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034, 3039 (1982).
43. The EAHCA required that by Sept. I, 1980, aU handicapped children between
the ages of three and twenty-one must be accomodated, provided that state law does not
prohibit or fail to authorize public education for nonhandicapped children between three
and five years or eighteen to twenty-one years of age. 20 U.S.c. § 1412(2)(B) (1976). At
least one federal coun required provision of services to a nineteen-year-old student
before the statutory 1980 date. Capello v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., No. 79
1006 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 1979); see also Frankel v. Commissioner of Educ.. 480 F. Supp.
1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
44. 20 U.S.c. § 1412 (I) (1976).
45. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
46. 20 U.S.c. §§ 1401(19), 1414(a)(5) (1976).
The term 'individualized education program' means a written statement for
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forded the opportunity to assist in shaping the IEP and appeal por
tions with which they disagree,47 and that children with handicaps
be "mainstreamed," that is, that they be educated with nonhandicap
ped children "to the maximum extent appropriate."48
In cases brought under the EAHCA, perhaps the most difficult
task confronting judges and administrative hearing officers has been
interpretation and application of the requirement that the education
of each child with a handicap be "appropriate."49 According to the
Act,
[t]he term "free appropriate public education" means special edu
cation and related services which (A) have been provided at pub
lic expense, under public supervision and direction, and without
charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency,
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary
school education in the State involved, and (D) are provided in
conformity with the individualized education program required
.
under ... this title. 50

In further explication, the Act defines two components of a free, ap
propriate public education-special education and related services:
The term "special education" means specially designed instruc
tion, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs
of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, instruc
each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a representative of the
local educational agency, ... the teacher, the parents or guardian of such
child, and whenever appropriate, such child, which statements shall include
(A) ... present levels of educational performance of such child, (B) annual
goals including short-term instructional objectives, (C). . . specific educational
services to be provided. . . ,and the extent to which such child will be able to
participate in regular education programs, (D) the projected date for ... such
services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures and
schedules for determining . . . whether instructional objectives are being
achieved.
It!. § 1401(19) (1976).
47. It!. § 1415(b) (1976).
48. It!. § 1412(5)(B) (1976). Participating states are to establish procedures to as
sure that "special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped children
from the regular educationaJ environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the
handicap is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and
services cannot be achieved satisfactorily." It!.
49. It!. § 1412(1) (1976). See, e.g., Colin v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375 (D.RJ.
1982); Norris v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 759 (D. Mass. 1981); Bales v.
Clarke, 523 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. Va. 1981); Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ.,
518 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Buchholtz v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Instruction. 315
N.W.2d 789 (Iowa 1982); Shanberg v. Pennsylvania, 57 Pa. Commw. 384,426 A.2d 232
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
50. 20 U.S.c. § 1401(18) (1976).
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tion in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in
hospitals and institutions. 51 The term "related services" means
transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and other sup
portive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psy
chological services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation,
and medical and counseling services, except that such medical
services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as
may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from spe
cial education . . . . 52

Although courts had little difficulty in deciding cases involving
significant failures of educational systems to comply with the proce
dural requirements of the EAHCA,53 the issue was less clear in many
other situations. One line of decisions struck down state laws, poli
cies, and practices limiting free public education to a fixed number
of days per year. 54 Some children with handicaps, particularly those
with severe or profound mental retardation or severe emotional dis
turbances, suffer a significant loss of functional skills and emotional
development if school is interrupted for a summer vacation. 55 For
some of these children, the time required to recoup lost capabilities
when school resumes is significantly greater than that required by
other, nonhandicapped children. 56 A number of judges and various
administrative tribunals concluded that the inflexible application of
rules limiting schooling to a fixed number of days prevents or limits
educators' individual consideration of the unique needs of each
child. Children who experience significant regression and slow re
coupment were thus being deprived of an "appropriate" education
.
and the educators were in violation of the EAHCA.57
51. Id § 1401(16) (1976).
52. Id § 1401(17) (1976).
53. See. e.g., Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1982) (failure of state educa
tional agencies to assure that local educational agencies took actions reasonably neces
sary to accomplish timely evaluation and placement in appropriate programs of all
children with handicapping conditions); Mattie T. v. Holladay, No. DC-75-31-S (N.D.
Miss. Jan. 26, 1979) (consent decree ) (class action challenging denial of educational serv
ices segregation in separate programs, denial of due process safeguards and the state's
failure to locate and identify all children with handicaps); Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F.
Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd in part, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980) (class action chal
lenging deficiencies in IEP and due process procedures).
54. Typically, the school term was fixed at 180 days per year. See infra note 57 and
accompanying text.
55. See Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 593 (E.D. Pa. 1979), remanded sub
nom., Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Scanlon
v. Battle, 452 U.S. 968 (1981).
56. Id at 595.
57. See, e.g., Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 511 F. Supp. 1263
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In a broad array of decisions, courts have held that the Act's
"appropriate" education requirement mandates a sufficiently high
teacher-pupil ratio for some students,58 private school placement for
a few,59 and maximum contact with nonhandicapped students for
others. 60 The judiciary, however, also recognized ,the limits of the
EAHCA. A number of courts have held that a child's right to an
"appropriate" education does not constitute a right to the best possi
ble education. 61 In Springdale School District No. 50 v. Grace ,62 for
example, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a deaf
student could ,receive an appropriate education (which included in
struction by a certified teacher of deaf persons) within her local
school district, even though the student could learn more quickly in
a residential school for the deaf located in another city:
The fact that [the child] may not, like many nonhandicapped chil
(N.D. Ga. 1981); Fetzer v. Mandan Pub. School Dist., No. AI-80-40 (D.N.D. Oct. 17,
1980); Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Pa. 1979), remanded sub nom., Battle
v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Scanlon v. Penn
sylvania, 452 U.S. 968 (1981); In re Richard K, No. 79-20 (Hooksett, N.H. Dist. Ct. June
8, 1979). In re Mahoney, (Bend, Ore. Aug. 29, 1978) (administrative hearing pursuant to
Pub. L. No. 94-142).
An Office for Civil Rights (OCR) Opinion concluded that the New Ham'pshire De
partment of Education had denied eleven complainants and "all handicapped children in
New Hampshire who may require an educational program in excess of 180 days per
year" an appropriate education through an "unwritten policy" and burdensome statute,
standards, and regulations which created a presumption that a 180-day school year is the
general rule. Office for Civil Rights (OCR), Opinion Regarding Complaint No, 01-79
1088 (HEW, Boston, MA, Jan. 18, 1980). OCR ruled that the Department had thus
violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.~.c. § 794 (1976 & Supp. V
1981), which bans discrimination on the basis of handicap in federally assisted programs.
OCR Opinion, supra, at 8. Of course, not all challenges to 180-day schooling limitations
have succeeded. See, e.g., Bales v. Clarke, 523 F. SllPP. 1366, 1370 (E.D. Va. 1981);
Anderson v. Thompson, 495 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Wis. 1980), aJl'd, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th
Cir. 1981); In re R.C., No. 1978-25 (Georgia Bd. of Educ. Oct. 12, 1978).
58. See, e.g., Colin K. v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375, 1386-87 (D.R.I. 1982).
59. See, e.g., Norris v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 529 F.Supp. 759, 766-67 (D.
Mass. 1981). Furthermore, having placed a student in an approved program, a state may
not avoid continued responsibility for the child by exercising its valid power of removing
the particular private school from the state list of approved programs. Vander Malle v.
Ambach, 673 F.2d 49, 53 (2d Cir. 1982).
60. See, e.g., Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 55
(N.D. Ala. 1981).
61. See, e.g., Springdale School Dist. No. 50 v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300, 304-06 (8th
Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3504 (1982) (in light of Board of Educ. v.
Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982»; Bales v. Clarke, 523 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. Va. 1981);
Buchholtz v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Instruction, 315 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa 1982); Shanberg
v. Pennsylvania, 57 Pa. Commw. 384, 386, 426 A.2d 232, 233 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981).
62. 656 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3504 (1982) (in
light of Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982».
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dren, reach her full potential is not due to any error in the district
court's interpretation of the Act or in its finding that the [local
school] could appropriately educate [her], but instead may well
result from forces outside the school enviroru.ilent. 63

Interpreting the "related services" requirement also occupied
considerable judicial time. A number of courts recognized the right
of students with handicaps to school-supplied or paid alternative
transportation to their educational programs, when the transporta
tion provided to nonhandicapped students was unsuitable because of
the particular handicaps, schedules, or geographic locations in
volved. 64 Other cases held psychotherapy to be a "related service"
that school districts must provide to certain children. with severe
emotional disturbances to enable them to benefit from special
education. 65
Because of the substantial cost of residential placements, school
districts have frequently resisted parents' requests that they be pro
vided as a related service. Courts and administrative tribunals, how- .
ever, have sometimes required such placements. 66 In Kruelle v.
Biggs,67 the federal district court in Delaware decided that, because .
of an eleven-year-old boy's combination of physical and mental
handicaps, (cerebral palsy and profound mental retardation), "it
would appear that full-time care is necessary in order to allow [him]
to learn."68 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals,69 noting that the
boy had the social skills of a six-month old child, could not commu
nicate, walk, dress himself, or eat unaided, affirmed the lower court's
ruling that the State Board of Education must provide a residential
placement appropriate to the boy's unique needs. 70
In North v. Dis/rict of Columbia Board of Education, 71 the board
argued that one student's educational needs could be satisfied in a
63. 656 F.2d at 305.
64. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107, 115 (W.D. Va. 1981); In re Scott
K, 92 Misc. 2d 681, 685-86, 400 N.Y.S.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977).
65. See, e.g., Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687. 691-92 (3d·
Cir. 1981); Papacoda v. Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 68, 72 (D. Conn. 1981); Gladys J. and
Laura J. v. Pearland lndep. School Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869, 878-79 (S.D. Tex. 1981); In re
"A" Family, 602 P.2d 157, 170 (Mont. 1979).
66. See, e.g., Erdman v. Connecticut, No. H80-253 (D. Conn. Aug. 22. 1980);
CapellO v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., No. 79-1006 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 1980).
67. 489 F. Supp. 169 (D. Del. 1980), a./Td sub nom., Kruelle v. New Castle County
School Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981).
68. 489 F. Supp. at 174.
69. Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981).
70. Id. at 698-99.
71. 471 F. Supp. 136 (D.D.C. 1979).
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day-care setting and that only his emotional needs required a resi
dential placement; the board should therefore not be required to
bear the cost of his placement. 72 The federal district court for the
District of Columbia, however, granted a preliminary injunction,
finding that the boy's emotional and educational problems were so
completely intertwined as to require the board to bear the cost under
the EAHCA.73
Some children with handicaps require certain health related
services to enable them to attend school. A federal court in Texas
found that air-conditioning of a regular public school classroom was
an EAHCA related service that the school must provide for a seven
year-old boy who was unable to control his body temperature. 74 The
air-conditioning enabled the boy to leave the "Plexiglass box" in
which he had attended classes and join the mainstream environment
of the classroom. 75 A more commonly required service, which has
figured in a number of cases, is clean, intermittent catheterization.
After some initial hesitation,76 several courts came to recognize this
technique as one of the related services which schools must provide
to some children under the EAHCA.77 Also, at least one federal
court has found that the assistance needed by a four-year-old child
with cystic fibrosis and tracheomalacia in order to insert and remove
a tracheotomy tube also qualifies as a related service to be provided
by the school under the Act.78
III.

ROWLEY

The "related services" question that has attracted the greatest
72. Id at 139.
73. Id at 141-42.
74. Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905, 911-12, 914 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
75. Id at 911-12.
76. See, e.g., Tatro v, Texas, 481 F. Supp. 1224, 1228-29 (N,D. Tex. 1979), vacared
and remanded, 625 F.2d 557 (5th CiT. 1980); see also Notice of Interpretation, 46 Fed.
Reg. 4912 (1981) (clean intermittent catheterization is a "related service" required by
some children under EAHCA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Notice
of Postponement oflnterpretation, 46 Fed, Reg. 25,614 (1981) (effective date of the no
tice of interpretation is postponed until funher notice to "permit a comprehensive review
of the related services requirements" of EAHCA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973. "[P)ending a final determination, .. the provision of clean intermittent
catheterization as a related service will be treated as an allowable cost" under EAHCA).
77. Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557, 562 (5th CiT. 1980); Tokarcik v. Forest Hills
School Dist., 49 U.S.L.W. 2336 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (mem.), affd. 665 F.2d 443 (3d Cir.
1981). cerro dened, 102 S. Ct. 3508 (1982).
78. Hawaii Dep't of Educ. v. Katherine D" 531 F. Supp, 517,525-26 D, Hawaii
1982).
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attention, however, is whether the EAHCA entitles a child with a
severe hearing impairment to the services of a school-provided sign
language interpreter in the regular school classroom. In a 1979 case,
In re M W ,79 an administrative hearing officer in the State of Geor
gia decided that such interpreter services were required for a boy
with a serious hearing impairment under both the EAHCA and sec
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 80 But the question re
mained generally undecided until June 28, 1982. On that date, the
Supreme Court of the United States announced its opinion in the
first case in which it had considered the EAHCA-Board of Educa
tion v. Rowley.81 In a split decision, the court ruled that the school
district did not have to provide Amy Rowley, a deaf elementary
school student, with a sign language interpreter in order to satisfy the
free, appropriate public education requirement of the Act.82
The decision has been viewed by some observers as striking a
serious blow to the educational rights of children with handicaps.83
Although hardly a victory for such rights, neither does the opinion
sound their death knell. It is a truism that hard cases make bad law.
It is equally true, however, that easy cases make misleading law
when their rulings are read too broadly and when they are applied
by courts, commentators, or administrators to situations differing
substantially from the simple case in which the rules were developed.
Avoiding the danger inherent in misapplication of the Rowley deci
sion necessitates careful consideration of precisely what the Court
did and did not say about the EAHCA. Because the unique facts of
this case weigh so heavily in its outcome, a full recitation of those
details is required.
Amy Rowley, an eight-year-old child with a severe hearing im
pairment was enrolled in a regular classroom of the Furnace Woods
School, in Peekskill, New York. 84 Before beginning Amy's school
ing and after a planning meeting with her parents, the school admin
79. No. S1979-1 (Floyd County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. Mar. 6, 1979).
80. 29 U.S.c. § 794 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). SeClion 504 bans discrimination on
the basis of handicap in programs receiving federal financial assistance. Its requirements
were interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in another case involving an
individual with a severe hearing impairment. Southeastern Community College v. Da
vis, 442 U.S. 397,405-07 (1979).
81. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (l982).
82. lti. at 3052.
83. See e.g., I American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities, ACCD News Net
(June 1982). "We find this decision shocking. It condones inferior and inadequate edu
cation for handicapped children." lti. at 10.
84. 102 S. Ct. at 3039-40.
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istrators made certain preparations for her arrival. Several of the
administrators attended a course in understanding sign-language
and a teletype machine was installed in the principal's office to facili
tate communications with Amy's parents, who are also deaf. Amy,
who is an excellent lipreader and has minimal residual hearing, was
placed in a regular kindergarten class. After a time, the school pro
vided her with an FM wireless hearing aid through which she could
hear words spoken by the teacher or fellow students into a transmit
ter during certain classroom activities. A sign-language interpreter
was assigned to the kindergarten class for a two-week experimental
period, but was removed after he reported that Amy did not need his
services at that time. 8S Amy successfully completed kindergarten.
In the fall of her first-grade year, an IEP was prepared for Amy
as required by the EAHCA. It provided that she should be educated
in a regular classroom, should continue to use the FM hearing aid,
and should receive instruction from a tutor for deaf individuals for
one hour each day and from a speech therapist for three hours each
week. 86 Amy's parents agreed with the IEP insofar as it went, but
insisted that, in addition, she be provided with a qualified sign-lan
guage interpreter in all academic classes. S7 The school administra
tors, after consulting the school district's Committee on the
Handicapped, which had received testimony from Amy's parents,
teachers, and o~hers on the education of deaf individuals, concluded
that Amy did not need an interpreter in her first-grade classroom.S8
The Rowleys, following the EAHCA appeals procedure, then
took their demand for' an interpreter to an independent examiner.
After a hearing, the examiner agreed with the school administrators
that Amy did not need an interpreter because she was "achieving
educationally, academically, and socially" without such assistance. 89
On appeal, the examiner's decision was affirmed by the New York
Commissioner of Education. 90 Following the Act's provision for ju
dicial review, the Rowleys then brought an action in federal court
85. 102 S. Ct. at 3039. The district court, considering the case in 1980, noted how
ever, that the interpreter's "recommendation was strictly limited to the particular class
for which he had rendered the service, and did not rule out the necessity of interpretation
in other classes or in subsequent academic years." Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F.
Supp. 528, 530 (S.D. N.Y.), affd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3034
(1982).
86. 102 S. Ct. at 3039.
87. Iii.
88. Iii.
89. Iii. at 3040.
90. Iii.
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claiming that the school's refusal to provide interpreter services con
stituted a denial of the "free appropriate public education" guaran
teed by the Act. 91
The district court agreed with the Rowleys.92 In struggling to
give meaning to the term "appropriate" education, the court rejected
what it saw as two possible extreme interpretations: (1)" 'Adequate'
education-that is, an education substantial enough to facilitate a
child's progress from one grade to another and to enable him or her
to earn a high school diploma"; and (2) an education "which enables
the handicapped child to achieve his or her full potential."93 In
stead, the district court settled on an intermediate standard which
"would require that each handicapped child be given an opportunity
to achieve his full potential commensurate with the opportunity pro
vided to other children."94
[T}his standard requires something more than the "adequate" ed
ucation described above. On the other hand, since even the best
public schools lack the resources to enable every child to achieve
his full potential, the standard would not require them to go so
far. . . . [This standard} requires that the potential of the handi
capped child be measured and compared to his or her perform
ance, and that the resulting differential or "shortfall" be compared
to the shortfall experienced by non-handicapped children. 95

Although the district court noted that Amy is a "bright, well-ad
justed child ... [who] performs better than the average child in her
class and is advancing easily from grade to grade,"96 it found that
the school administrators had "ignore[d] the importance of compar
ing her performance to that of nonhandicapped students of similar
intellectual calibre and comparable energy and initiative."97 In the
court's opinion, Amy's "educational shortfall is greater than that of
her peers."98 Using the standard it had developed to measure "ap
propriateness"99 and relying on expert testimony that "every deaf
91. Id
92. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528 (S.D.N.Y.), off'd. 632 F.2d 945 (2d .
Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
93. Id at 534.
94. Id.
95. Id
96. Id
97. Id
98. Id at 535.
99. See supra text accompanying note 94.
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child fares better in class with an interpreter,"IOO the district court
concluded that Amy was entitled to an interpreter "to bring her edu
cational opportunity up to the level of the educational opportunity
being offered to her non-handicapped peers."101 It found that
"Amy's education would be more 'appropriate' with than without an
interpreter." 102
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a two-to
one decision, affirmed the district court's judgment, 103 including, ap
parently, its standard for "appropriateness" .of an education. 104 The
appeals court, however, took pains to emphasize the narrowness of
its holding. "The evidence upon which our decision rests is con
cerned with a particular child, her atypical family, her upbringing
and training since birth, and her classroom experience. In short our
decision is limited to the unique facts of this case and is not intended
as authority beyond this case." 105
The Supreme Court, after reviewing the legislative history of
the EAHCA, rejected the lower courts' standard lO6 for determining
when an educational program is "appropriate": "The District Court
and the Court of Appeals ... erred when they held that the Act
requires New York to maximize the potential of each handicapped
child commensurate with the opportunity provided nonhandicapped
. children."107 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the five-member major
ity,108 read the Act's intent as "more to open the door of public edu
cation to handicapped children on appropriate terms than to
guarantee any particular level of education once inside."I09 He con
cluded that Congress has sought "primarily to identify and evaluate
handicapped children, and to provide them with access to a free
100. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 535 (S.D.N.Y.). offd, 632 F.2d
945 (2d Cir. 1980). rev'd. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982) (emphasis in original).
101. Id
102. Id at 536.
103. Rowley v. Board of Educ.• 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3034
(1982).
104. The court of appeals stated its agreement with the district court's conclusions
of law. Id at 947.
105. Id at 948.
106. See supra text accompanying note 94.
107. 102 S. Ct. at 3048. Further, U[w)hatever Congress meant by an 'appropriate'
education. it is clear that it did not mean a potential-maximizing education." Id, at 3046
n.21.
108. The majority was composed of Justice Rehnquist. Chief Justice Burger, and
Justices Powell, Stevens. and O'Connor.
109. 102 S. Ct. at 3043.
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public education." 110 Justice Rehnquist also noted that: "Congress
did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational
standard than would be necessary to make such access meaning
ful."111 He stated that "if personalized instruction is being provided
with sufficient supportive services to permit the child to benefit from
the instruction, and the other items on the definitional checklist are
satisfied, the child is receiving a 'free appropriate public education'
as defined by the Act." 112
In the opinion of advocates for children with handicaps and of
the Court's three dissenting members,113 the foregoing interpreta
tions of Congressional intent are clearly erroneous. Justice White,
writing for the dissent, argued that "[t]he legislative history. . . di
rectly supports the conclusion that the Act intends to give handi
capped children an educational opportunity commensurate with that
given other children." 114 He concluded that the majority's standard
for deciding that Amy was receiving an appropriate education-that
she was receiving "some specialized instruction from which she ob
tained some benefit [which enabled her to pass] from grade to grade
... falls far short of what .the Act intended." 115
It wo\1ld be a serious mistake, however, to accept the excerpts
quoted thus far as a fair summary of the Court's opinion. Among its
more positive aspects, the opinion explicitly acknowledged that the
EAHCA requires "personalized instruction," 116 that is "educational
instruction specially designed to meet the unique needs of the handi
capped child." 117 The decision also recognized the Act's mandate of
related services; that the instruction of a child with a handicap must
be "supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child to
'benefit' from the instruction."118 The Court further discerned that
Congress intended that children with handicaps be provided with
something exIra in the way of educational services: "[F]urnishing
handicapped children with only such services as are available to
110. Id., at 304S.
Ill. Id. at 3043; if. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974) (foreclosure of mean
ingful education amounted to illegal discrimination).
112. \02 S. Ct. at 3042. By "definitional checklist," the Coun was referring to
requisite elements "A" through "0" in the EAHCA's definition of "free appropriate
public education." 20 U.S.c. § 140I(lS)(A)-(0) (1976). See supra text accompanying
note 50.
113. Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall joined in a dissenting opinion.
114. \02 S. Ct. at 3055 (White, J., dissenting).
115. Id. (emphasis in original).
116. Id. at 3049.
117. Id. at 3041.
liS. Id.
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nonhandicapped children would in all probability fall short of the
statutory requirement of 'free appropriate public education
, "119
The Court's principal holding was that appropriate education
consists of "personalized instruction with sufficient support services
to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction." 120
But how great must the "benefit" be? This determination, the Court
said, presents "a more difficult problem"121 and it explicitly refused
to provide a general answer:
We do not attempt today to establish anyone test for determining
the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children
covered by the Act. Because in this case we are presented with a
handicapped child who is receiving substantial specialized instruc
tion and related services, and who is performing above average in
the regular classrooms of a public school system, we confine our
analysis to that situation. 122

The Court's characterization of Amy Rowley's specialized in
struction and related services as "substantial" was hardly an over
statement. 123 The school had provided her, in Justice Blackmun's
words, with "considerably more than 'a teacher with a loud
voice.' "124 It had made commendable efforts to accommodate her
needs. There is much force in Justice Blackmun's conclusion that
Amy's educational program, "viewed as a whole, offered her .an op
portunity to understand and participate in the classroom that was
substantially equal to that given her nonhandicapped classmates." 125
119. Id at 3047.
120. Id at 3049 (emphasis added).
121. Id at 3048.
122. Id at 3049. The Supreme Court's Limiting of the precedential effect of its
ruling echoed a similar cautionary notice by the court of appeals. See supra text accom
panying note 105.
123. See 102 S. Ct. at 3039. The school had provided a tutor, speech therapist,
hearing aid and (for a trial period) a sign language interpreter; had installed a teletype
machine; and had consulted with a Committee on the Handicapped. See supra text ac
companying note 85.
124. 102 S. Ct. at 3053 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (borrowing a phrase from the
Court's dissenters).
125. Id (emphasis in original). Justice White, in dissent, wrote that Amy, "with
out a sign language interpreter, comprehends less than half of what is said in the class
room-less than half of what normal children comprehend." Id at 3055 (White, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice White provides no citation on which to base his
assertion, and the district court opinion raises questions concerning both the percentage
(less than half) and its basis (what normal children comprehend):
[B)y making use of her hearing aids and her lipreading skills, which she would
be doing under ideal classroom conditions, Amy can identify 59% of the words
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The Supreme Court's conclusion regarding Amy Rowley's per
formance is unchallenged. She is performing above the average
level in regular classrooms at a public school. 126 But even here, the
Court did not attempt to create a general standard from Amy's par
ticular situation: "We do not hold today that every handicapped
child who is advancing from grade to grade in a regular public
school system is automatically receiving a 'free appropriate public
education.' "127 How a child fares in the grading and advancement
system of a regular public school classroom environment thus "con
stitutes an important factor in determining educational benefit,"128
but such a factor is not dispositive of the issue.
In Rowley, the Supreme Court set out to define the term "appro
priate" and to determine the amount of services required by that
term. The Court ended up explaining the term "appropriate" with
the terms "meaningful" and "benefit," but refused to define the
amount of services required to ,satisfy this new standard. Thus,
while the opinion provided little guidance in determining the level of
services the Act requires,129 it did not eviscerate Congre,ss' mandate.
, Rather, in a manner strikingly similar to the Act's core philosophy,
the Supreme court opted for an individualized approach in weighing
the SUfficiency of the benefits of Amy's and potentially other chil
dren's educational programs.
Whether the Court will continue to eschew generalizations in
future EAHCA cases remains to be seen. But, at least for the pres
which are spoken to her. . . . I find that Amy is capable of discriminating con
siderably less than 100% of what is spoken in class-probably in the neighbor
hoodoj59%.
Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp, 528, 532 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 632 F,2d 945 (2d CiT.
1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982). (emphasis added). Also, it should not be forgotten
that Amy was provided with one hour of tutoring each day in addition to her classroom
instruction. See supra text accompanying note 86.
126. 102 S. Ct. at 3049. "Amy's scores on the Metropolitan Achievement Test were
about average for her class, and her scores on the Stanford Achievement Test which was
administered to her in sign language, were well above average. Amy's school records
establish that she is performing above the median for her class," Rowley v. Board of
Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528. 532 (S.D,N.Y.) (footnote omitted),affd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.
1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982),
127. 102 S, Ct. at 3049 n.25, It is not clear how the Coun would react if a child
were not making progress.
128. Id at 3049. The Coun later stated that "[w)hen the handicapped child is
being educated in the regular classrooms of a public school system, the achievement of
passing marks and advancement from grade to grade will be one important jactor in
determining educational benefit." Id at 3051 n.28 (emphasis added).
129. As Justice White observed, " 'meaningful' is no more enlightening than 'ap
propriate:" Id at 3055 (White, J., dissenting).
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ent, no general standard has been established; it is left to those who
develop and initially review IEPs to determine, in the first instance,
the type and amount of specialized education and related services
that are required to give each unique child an appropriate, meaning
ful education providing sufficient benefit. The Court placed heavy
emphasis on the fundamental role of those involved in that initial
determination: "The primary responsibility for formulating the edu
cation to be accorded a handicapped child, and for choosing the edu
cational method most suitable to the child's needs, was left by the
Act to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the
parents or guardians of the child."130
Although courts are not to second-guess these education pro
gram developers on questions of educational "policy,"131 "theo
ries,"132 or "methodology,"133 a substantive as well as procedural
review role for the judiciary was strongly affirmed by the Supreme
Court: "Congress expressly rejected provisions that would have so
severely restricted the role of reviewing courts" to reviewing only for
state compliance with the Act's procedural requirements.l 34 The
Court went on to state that "a court's inquiry in suits brought under
[the Act] is twofold. First, has the state complied with the proce
dures set forth in the Act? And second, is the individualized educa
tion program developed through the Act's procedures reasonably
calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits?" 135
Thus, parents may still tum to the courts for relief not only for cor
rection of procedural deficiencies in development of their child's
IEP, but also when they believe that the program, although the result
of a procedurally correct process, still does not provide the student
an "appropriate" education.
130. ld at 3051.
131. ld "[T]he provision that a reviewing court base its decision on the 'prepon
derance of the evidence' is by no means an invitation to the courts to substitute their own
notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they re
view." ld "[C]ourts lack the 'specialized knowledge and experience' necessary to re
solve the 'persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.' Id at 3052 (citing San
Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,42 (1973».
132. 102 S. Ct. at 3052. "[I]t seems highly unlikely that Congress intended courts
to overturn a State's choice of appropriate educational theories in a proceeding con
ducted pursuant to § 1415(e)(2)." ld at 3051 (footnote omitted).
133. "[O]nce a court determines that the requirements of the Act have been met,
questions of methodOlogy are for resolution by the States." Id at 3052.
134. Id at 3050.
135. ld at 3051. (footnotes omitted). Included in a court's procedural inquiry will
be the determination "that the State has created an IEP for the child in question which
conforms with the requirements of [the Act]." Id at 3051 n.27.

382

WESTERN NEW ENGLANlJ LAW REVIEW

IV.

[Vol. 5:363

ApPLICATiON OF ROWLEY

What will be the effect of Rowley on the education of other chil
dren with handicaps? Insufficient time has elapsed to answer that
question definitively. A few resulting principles, however, are clear.
Because the Court explicitly limited its ruling to Amy Rowley's par
ticular case, the opinion clearly does not signify that every deaf child
who requires a sign language interpreter will be denied that service.
Moreover, EAHCA's core principles emerged from the decision in
tact; Rowley affirmed the rights of children with handicaps:
(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

(7)
(8)

to be educated by public schools without charge;136
to be provided with individualized, beneficial, "meaningful"
services, designed through the IEP process; 137
to be "mainstreamed" where possible; 138
to receive an instructional program that approximates the
grade levels used in the state's regular education program;139
to be provided with related and supportive serVices needed to
derive benefit from their education; 140
to have parents or guardians actively involved in the plan
ning of their education;141
to challenge the adequacy of their education programs in due
process hearings; 142 and
to challenge in federal court both the substance of their IEP
and the procedures afforded for its development and
review.l 43

Although Rowley's ultimate effect on the education of children
with handicaps cannot yet be seen, it may be useful to examine how
the opinion might have affected the pre-Rowley decisions discussed
earlier in this article. 144 Clearly, Rowley would not have changed the
outcome of cases such as Springdale, 145 in which courts held that the
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id at 3049.
Id
Id
Id
140. Id
141. Id at 3050.
142. Id at 3039.
143. Id at 3050-5\. Because of Rowley'S emphasis on the primary role of local and
state educational agenCies in developing and reviewing a child's IEP, see id at 3039,
advocates for children with handicaps would be well advised to contest inappropriate
programs or inadequate provisions of services at the earliest possible point in the admin
istrative process. See generally M. BUDOFF, supra note 30. B. CUTLER, UNRAVELING
THE SPECIAL EDUCATION MAZE: AN ACTION GUIDE FOR PARENTS (1981).
144. See supra notes 53-78 and accompanying tex\.
145. Springdale School Dis\. No. 50 v. Grace, 656 F.2d 300 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated
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right to an "appropriate" education does not constitute a right to the
best possible education. 146 These decisions might well be viewed as
harbingers of the more restrictive language of the Rowley opinion.
And Rowley would only have strengthened the holdings of those
cases l47 in which school systems were found to. be in significant non
compliance with procedural provisions of the EAHCAI48 Further
more, the lower court rulings requiring the provision of related
services such as transportation,149 catheterization,150 and assistance
with a tracheotomy tube,151 would be viewed as satisfying even the
more stringent standards that some may derive from the Rowley
opinion. These services were required merely "to open the door of
public education" 152 to the affected children; merely "to provide
them with access."153
It is more difficult to speak confidently of Rowley's impact on
cases where "mainstreaming" of students, with the attendant provi
sion of required related services, has been ordered by the courtS. 154
Viewed in one light, the Supreme Court might characterize this issue
as one involving educational "theory" or "methodology," falling
within the purview of educators rather than courts. J55 Yet in Rowl
ey, the Court clearly recognized and noted the "mainstreaming pref
erence" of the EAHCAI56 Thus, it seems most likely that it would
and remanded, 102 S. Ct. 3504 (in light of Rowley), on remand, 693 F.2d 41 (8th Cir.
1982),pelilion/or cert.jiled, 51 U.S.L.W. 3583 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1983) (No. 82-1292).
146. 656 F.2d at 304. In one post-Rowley decision, Harrell v. Wilson County
Schools, 293 S.E.2d 687 (N.c. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 295 S.E.2d 759 (N.C. 1982),peli
lion/or cert.jiled, 51 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Jan. 3, 1983) (No. 82-1111), the court held that
neither the EAHCA nor state law requires a local school agency to provide students with
handicaps the most appropriate education. In dicta, however, the court interpreted the
state special education statute by quoting Justice White's dissent in Rowley: "We believe
that our own General Assembly 'intended to eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least
to the extent that the child will be given an equal opportunity to learn if that is reason
ably possible. . . .' Under this standard a handicapped child should be given an oppor
tunity to achieve his full potential commensurate with that given other children." Id. at
690 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. at 3055 (White, J., dissenting».
147. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
148. "[W)e think that the importance Congress attached to these procedural safe
guards cannot be gainsaid." 102 S. Ct. at 3050.
149. Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107, 115 (W.O. Va. 1981); In re Scott K, 92
Misc. 2d 681, 685-86, 400 N.Y.S.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1977).
ISO. Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980).
151. Hawaii Dep't of Educ. v. Katherine D., 531 F. Supp. 517 (D. Hawaii 1982).
152. 102 S. Ct. at 3036.
153. Id.
154. Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Campbell v. Talladega
County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
155. See 102 S. Ct. at 3036.
156. Id. at 3049 & n.24.
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decide such cases under its general rule: Are the services required to
permit the child to benefit sufficiently from the instruction?157 In
determining sufficiency of the benefit, the Court would probably give
considerable weight to the child's IEP and any administrative hear
ing decisions addressing it,158 provided that all due process proce
dural requirements have been followed. 159
Children with handicaps will find considerable support in Rowl
ey for a right to an extended school year,160 provided that such is
called for in their IEP's. Consider the reasoning of the Third Circuit
in BailIe v. Pennsylvania: 161
We believe the inflexibility of the defendants' policy of refusing
to provide more than 180 days of education to be incompatible
with the Act's emphasis on the individual. Rather than ascertain
ing the reasonable educational needs of each child in light of rea
sonable educational goals, and establishing a reasonable program
to attain those goals, the 180 day rule imposes with rigid certainty
a program restriction which may be wholly inappropriate to the
child's educational objectives. This the Act will not permit. 102

Such reasoning would appear to be wholly compatible with and am
ply supported by Rowley. A federal district court in Eastern Mis
souri reached this conclusion in March, 1983, when it held that
Missouri's policy of refusing to provide more than 180 days of edu
cation for children with severe handicaps is incompatible with the
EAHCA.163 The court found that, because the state policy pre
cluded "individualized consideration of and instruction for each
child," the state was failing to provide these children with "the basic
floor of opportunity" embodied in the Act. l64
.
Other pre-Rowley decisions described above requiring the pro
vision of psychological programming services,165 residential 106 or
157. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
158. See 102 S. Ct. at 3051-52 & 3051 nn.27-30.
159. See supra note 131.
160. See 102 S. Ct. 3041-42; see also supra note 57.
161. 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom., Scanlon v. Battle. 452 U.S.
968 (1981).
162. Id at 280.
163. Yaris v. Special School Dist., 51 U.S.L.W. 2553 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 2, 1983).
164. Id. at 2554. The coun also held that because Missouri receives federal funds
that it distributes to local school districts for the purpose of educating children with
handicaps during the summer months, without comparable services for children with
severe handicaps, the state was also in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973. See supra note 80.
165. See supra note 65.
166. See supra note 66.
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private schoo1'67 placements, or higher teacher/student ratiosl 68
would also appear to be subject to this "meaningful benefit" rule. As
discussed above,169 however, the Court in Rowley provided no gui
dance for determining the adequacy of the benefit required other
than emphasizing its individualized nature. I7O Thus, decisions in
cases of this nature will more than likely continue to reflect the indi
vidual perceptions of school administrators, hearing officers, and
judges regarding "adequacy" of the benefit as well as the individual
needs of the students involved. For example, in one post-Rowley
opinion, 17 I the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the
district court had "ample authority under the Act" to order the
placement of a severely retarded boy with "autistic-like" behavior in
a residential program upon finding that he needed residential care
with "round-the-clock training . . . in order to make any. educa
tional progress." 172
It is also quite likely that in making these decisions, the test sug
gested in Justice Blackmun's concurrence will figure largely, at either
a conscious or subconscious level, whether the child's program,
"viewed as a whole, offer[s] [the child] an opportunity to understand
and participate in the classroom [on a basis] substantially equal to
167. See supra note 59. In Lang v. Braintree School Comm., ~45 F. Supp. 1221 (D.
Mass. 1982), one of the few relevant post-Rowley decisions reported. the federal district
court in Massachusetts refused to order continued private schooling for an eighteen year
old student with mental retardation, mental illness, and epilepsy. The court, however,
recognizing that the student's IEP reflected the EAHCA's "legitimate educational philos
ophy" of mainstreaming, found that "there is every reason to believe, that [the student's)
placement in a public school setting, with the proper special education and support serv
ices, would be of greater benefit to her than remaining in a private school setting." Id at
1228. In similar fashion, the North Carolina Court of Appeals recently affirmed a lower
state court's decision that a hearing-impaired child need not be transferred from a public
to a private school in order to satisfy the appropriate education requirements of both the
EAHCA and the state special ed.ucation statute. Harrell v. Wilson County Schools, 293
S.E.2d 687 (N.c. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 295 S.E.2d 759 (N.C. 1982),pelilionjor cerl.
filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Jan. 3, 1983) (No. 82-1111). The North Carolina court
noted that the child's public school program had been developed in substantial compli
ance with federal and state rules for IEP's, that it is consistent with federal and state
mainstreaming policies, and that it meets even the more rigorous state standard that "a
handicapped child should be given an opportunity to achieve his full potential commen
surate with that given other children." 293 S.E.2d at 690.
168. Colin K. v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375 (D.R.1. 1982).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
170. "It is clear that the benefits obtainable by children at one end of the spectrum
will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at the other end, with infinite
variations in between." 102 S. Ct. at 3053.
171. Abrahamson v. Hershman, No. 82-1201, slip op. (1st Cir. Feb. 24,1983).
172. ld, slip op. at 12 (citation omitted) (emphasis in origimil).
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[the child's] nonhandicapped classmates."173
It is interesting to speculate on the effect that Rowley would
have had on the M. W. case l74 had Rowley been decided first. Con
trary to Rowley, the M W. ruling required provision of a sign lan
guage interpreter and other supplemental aids and services to
facilitate the continued "mainstreaming" of a seriously hearing-im
paired child who had maintained a "B" average in regular class
rooms without such aids, but with the voluntary assistance of his
family and certain teachers and students. The decision, however,
was made by a school department hearing officer. If the school
board had appealed the decision to federal courts, the issue becomes
whether the judiciary would have substantially deferred to the state
educational agency as called for in Rowley, I7S or would have applied
the Supreme Court's "benefit" test. A preliminary question, how
ever, is as to whether the hearing officer's order would have been the
same had it not preceded Rowley.
V.

THE ROLE OF PARENTS AFTER ROWLEY

In Rowley, the Supreme Court of the United States placed con
siderable emphasis on the vital role Congress has assigned to parents
and guardians in assuring the appropriateness of handicapped chil
dren's education under the EAHCA. At one point the Court stated
that "Congress sought to protect individual children by providing for
parental involvement in the development of State plans and policies
. . . and in the formulation of the child's individual education pro
gram."176 Elsewhere, it observed that "Congress placed every bit as
much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents
and guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the
administrative process . . . as it did upon the measurement of the
resulting IEP against a substantive standard." 177 Yet again the
Court observed that "[t]he requirements that parents be permitted to
file complaints regarding their child's education, and be present
when the child's IEP is formulated, represent only two examples of
Congress' effort to maximize parental involvement in the education
of each handicapped child."178 Finally, the Court concluded that,
173.

102 S. Ct. at 3053 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
in re M.W.. No. S1979-1 (Floyd County, Ga., Bd. of Educ. Mar. 6, 1979).
175. "[C]ouns must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable educa
tional methods upon the States." 102 S. Ct. at 3051 (citation omitted).
176. id. at 3052 (citation omitted).
177. id. at 3050.
178. id. at 3038 n.6.
174.
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"[a]s this very case demonstrates, parents and guardians will not lack
ardor in seeking to ensure that handicapped children receive all of
the benefits to which they are entitled by the Act." 179
There is no question that the Court read accurately Congress'
intent regarding the central role parents and guardians should play
in the functioning of EAHCAI80 It was therefore ironic and distres
sing that, less than six weeks after these expressions of agreement by
the legislative and judicial branches supporting a key parental role,
the executive branch of the federal government should attempt to
weaken that role. On August 4, 1982, the United States Department
of Education proposed to amend the regulations for the EAHCAI81
in order, the Department said, "[t]o reduce fiscal and administrative
. burdens on recipients . . . and ... to address various problems that
have arisen in the implementation of the program . . . ."182 The
effect, however, of a number of the proposed revisions would have
been to reduce parents' involvement in the planning and review of
their handicapped children's education programs. The proposal
would, for example, have eliminated requirements for parental con
sent before a pre-placement evaluation is conducted or an initial
placement is made. 183 The proposal would have also reduced re
quirements designed to ensure parental participation at IEP meet
ings,184 and eliminated parents' right of access to all evidence before
a due process hearing. 185
These were among a multitude of changes l86 that were viewed
179. Id. at 3052.
180. Even before the Rowley decision, lower courts had enforced the EAHCA
mandates for parental involvement. See, e.g., Vogel v. School Bd., 491 F. Supp. 989
(W.D. Mo. 1980).
181. Assistance to States for Education of Handicapped Children, 47 Fed. Reg.
33,836 (1982) (proposed regulation to be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 3(0).
182. id.
183. Id. at 33,841, discussing proposed deletion of requirements in 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.504(b) (1982).
.
184. 47 Fed. Reg. 33,840 (1982), discussing proposed deletion of requirements in
34 C.F.R. §§ 300.345(b)-(d) (1982).
185. Provisions of current regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 300.508(a)(3) (1982), not in
cluded in proposed regulation. See 47 Fed. Reg. 33,857 (1982) (proposed regulation to
be codified at 34 C.F.R. § 300.149).
186. Other changes included, but were not limited to the proposed deletion of a
thirty-day timeline between a child's evaluation and the IEP meeting; elimination of par
ents' right to open due process hearings to the public; new authorization to charge par
ents for a portion of the services a child receives while placed in a residential program;
deletion of requirements that schools provide children with handicaps a continuum of
placements and services, and educate a child as close to horne as possible; and the dele
tion of a requirement that evaluation instruments be administered or validated by "qual
ified" personnel. See OverSight on Education lor All Handicapped Chl1dren Act: Hearings
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by many parents and other advocates for children with handicaps as
assailing some of EAHCA's most important safeguards for ensuring
the provision of an appropriate education. 187 At public hearings
held in eight cities across the nation,188 parents, demonstrating some
of the "ardor" of which Justice Rehnquist wrote,189 raised a "storm
of protest."190 As a result, Secretary of Education, T.H. Bell, an
nounced on September 29, 1982, that he was withdrawing the pro
posed changes for "[t]hose portions of the regulations that are the
major sources of the concern and apprehension." 191 Included in the
. six areas of withdrawn proposals was that dealing with "parental
consent prior to evaluation or initial placement."192
Several members of Congress and numerous advocates have ex
pressed concern, however, that the Department may resubmit with
drawn sections at a later date "in milder form."193 A memorandum
to Tom Anderson, Special Counsel to the Secretary of Education,
from Joe Beard, Deputy General Counsel of the Department, al
though repudiated by Bell,194 lends support to these concerns. The
memo suggests that it
might be a good idea to consider sending [the Department's final
regulation] up [to Congress] in two or more packages, with the less
controversial part. in one package, and the more controversial

Bifore the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 79-86 (1982) (statement of B.E. Hamilton. Education
Oir., Children's Defense Fund) [hereinafter cited as Hearings); id. at 99-162 (statement of
Terrell Bell, Secretary, United States Department of Education) (defense of the proposed
regulations).
187. Senator Edward Kennedy: "I think it is important to note that in many ways
these regulations go against the grain of the recent Supreme Court decision in ... Row
ley. The Supreme Court strongly affirmed that the ultimate goal of the act was to pro
vide the handicapped student with an adequate educational opportunity. The schools
must provide meaningful services to the students. And to do so. parental involvement is
essential." Hearings, supra note 184, at 27; see also id. at 76-86 (statement of B.E. Hamil
ton); id. at 87-98 (statement of H. Rutherford Turnbull lll. Secretary. Association for
Retarded Citizens of the United States); Senator Q.N. Burdick also stated that "in some
cases, the rights of the handicapped children would be weakened if these proposals were
to be implemented as currently written . . . . Any changes which reduce a parent's par
ticipation must be critically scrutinized and questioned." Id. at 163-65.
188. See 47 Fed. Reg. 39,652 (1982).
189. See \02 S. Ct. at 3052.
190. Boston Globe, Sept. 30, 1982, at 3, col.. 1.
19\. Id.
192. 47 Fed. Reg. 49,871-72 (1982). Other proposals withdrawn related to least
restrictive environment, related services, timelines, attendance of evaluation personnel at
IEP meetings and qualifications of personnel. Id.
193. Boston Globe, Sept. 30, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
194. Id.
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parts in several packages . . . . In this manner, certain controver
sial parts will not kill off the less controversial parts, and, also, we
may be able to divide the enemy . . . . 'By forcing separate votes,
we may be able to pull it off. On the other hand, Congress may
find this to be a trick, which it definitely is, and may react nega
. Iy . . . . 195
.
tlve

As this article goes to press, the Department has not yet issued
either final revised regulations, or proposed regulations to replace
those which were withdrawn. 196
.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although there are surprising discrepancies among various
courts of the number of children with handicaps who are receiving
special education and related services nationwide,197 all data indi
195. Note to Tom Anderson from Joe Beard, Office of the General Counsel,
United States Department of Education (Mar. 30, 1982) (on file at the Center for Law
and Health Sciences. Boston University School of Law).
196. It was reported that proposed regulations for section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 may also be published for public comment in late 1983. Mental Health Law
Project, Update I (Mar. 28, 1983). These proposals, which were issued by the United
States Department of Justice, might also have significantly affected public education for
children with handicaps. See supra notes 57, 80, 164. In a class action brought in New
Mexico, which has elected not to accept federal funds under EAHCA, the Court of Ap
peals for the Tenth Circuit noted that when a state permits "great disparity among the
various school districts in their treatment of handicapped students," it arguably violates
section 504. New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 855
(10th Cir. 1982). Plaintiffs and defendants have since signed an agreement that was sub
mitted to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico for approval.
New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, No. 75-633-M (D.N.M.) (settle
ment agreement Aug. 3 J, 1982). On March 2 I. 1983, however, Vice President George
Bush, in a letter to Robert J. Funk of the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund,
announced that the Department of Justice and the Presidential Task Force on Regula
tory Relief "have decided not to issue a revised set of coordination guidelines [for section
504)." The Vice President noted that, in the review process which arrived at this deci
sion. "[e) specially important were the personal views and experiences of those most di·
rectly affected by these regulations. The comments of handicapped individuals, as well
as their families, provided invaluable insight into the impact of the 504 guidelines." Let
ter from Vice President of the United States George Bush to Robert J. Funk (Mar. 2J,
1983) (on file at the Center for Law and Health Sciences, Boston University School of
Law).
197. The General Accounting Office (GAO) reports that an Office of Special Edu
cation (OSE) survey calculated that a total of "4,178,631 handicapped children, or 8.55
percent of the estimated 5-17 year old population, were reported as receiving special
education and related services in the 1980-81 school year. OCR (Office for Civil Rights)
data supplied by school districts indicate that 2,615,852 children received special educa
tion. Another survey, using information supplied by school principals, estimated that
slightly over 3 million children ages 3-21 were receiving special education on December
I, 1978." Disparities Still Exist, supra note 27, at 20 (footnotes omitted). A GAO analy
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cate that, during the past decade, the United States has moved a con
siderable distance toward fulfilling the historic promise of a free
public education for all. 198 This progress has been spurred by state
and federal litigation and legislation, but principally by federal Pub
lic Law 94-142, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act.l 99
In Board v. Education v. Rowley, 200 the Supreme Court of the United
States, although adopting a very limited view of Congress' goals in
passing the Act, did uphold the Act's basic guarantees. Most impor
tantly, the Court limited its holding concerning the adequacy of edu
cational services to the particular case of Amy Rowley. The Court
explicitly refused to set forth a general standard for measuring the
sufficiency of services provided to other children. The Court also
recognized that despite the fact that a child with handicaps is ad
vancing from grade to grade in a regular public school classroom,
one may not automatically conclude that the child is receiving an
appropriate education.
Questions of program adequacy are thus left primarily to the
IEP development and appeal process for individualized determina
tions. Advocates for children with handicaps would therefore be
well advised to contest inappropriate or inadequate plans at the ear
liest possible point in the administrative process. As the Court rec
ognized, parents and guardians can play a key role in this process.
In light of recent attempts to reduce parental involvement, it is clear
that, for the foreseeable future, continuing vigilance and advocacy
will be required of parents and all others concerned with the welfare
of children with handicaps to ensure that they are not deprived of
their hard-won right to a free appropriate public education.

sis of differences between the OSE and OCR data indicates that they may be attributable,
inler alia, to different data collection methods and timing of data collection, but con
cludes that further investigation is needed. Id at 21-26.
198. "While the findings indicate that not all children have equal access to special
education, the Congressional objective that those most in need of services would receive
them with Public Law 94-142 has largely been accomplished. The priorities to first serve
the unserved and second the most severely handicapped children within each category
may have been realized and, therefore, may have become meaningless. . . ." Id at 80.
199. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1420 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
200. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).

